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1911 

Copy 1 

GRES8, ( HOUSE OF liEPRESENTATIVES. J Report 

%a oci>sion. r j No. 185. 



INFORMATION CONCERNING ARMY POSTS. 



December 18, 1911. — Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed. 



Mr. BuLKLEY, from the '"Committee on Expenditures in *tt€ War 
Department, submitted the foIlo\\ing 

REPORT. 

[To accompany H. Res. 343.] 

The Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, to which 
was referred the resohition (H. Res. 343) requesting the Secretary of 
War to furnish information concerning alleged needless expense of 
maintaining the Army, begs leave to submit the following report and 
recommends that said resolution be passed. 

The Annual Report of the wSecretary of War for the year 1911, dated 
December 4, lf)ll, contains the following language concerning the 
distribution of the mobile Army of the United States and the expense 
of maintaining it at widely scattered Army posts: 

The mobile Army itself is distributed among 49 Army posts in 24 States and Ter- 
ritories. Thirty-one of these posts have a capacity for less than a regiment each; only 
6 have a capacity for more than a regiment; and only 1 has a capacity for a brigade. 
The average number of organizations to each of the 49 posts is only 9 companies, 
giving an average strength in men for each post of only 650. 

Nearly all of these posts have been located m their present situations for reasons 
which are either now totally obsolete or which were from the beginning purely local. 
Most of them were originally placed where they are with reference to possible Indian 
troubles duruig times when such troubles were possible. Comparatively iev^ of them 
are in positions suited to meet the strategic needs of national action or defense. 

The posts have also imiversally been constructed upon a plan which involves a 
maximum initial cost of construction and a maximum cost of maintenance both in 
money and men. Instead of using compact quadrangles of barracks, such as are com- 
monly found in other countries, leaving the officers to find private quarters near by, 
we have b\iilt our posts in the form of scattered settlements, usually far remote from 
large towns and cities. This involves large details of men for police and guard duty 
while the posts are occupied, and even when the troops are temporarily withdrawn for 
maneuver or other purpose a heavy drain is made upon the size of the mobilized force, 
through the necessitj^ of leaving large numbers of caretakers at each of the posts. 

In short, we have scattered our Army over the country as if it were merely groups 
of local constabulary instead of a national organization. The result is an Army which 
is extraordinarily expensive to maintain, and one whose efficiency for the main purpose 
of its existence has been nullified so far as geographical location can nullify it. It is 
true that the small imits into which it has thus been subdivided have as a whole 
maintained their efficiency to a remarkable extent. It is also true that the short- 
comings imposed upon the Army by its lack of organization have not been manifested 



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2 IISrFOBMATIOX CONCERNING ARMY POSTS. Ay^"^*^' \^ 

in the recent wars in which it has been engaged. But the chief end of maintaining 
a military establishment is that the country may be prepared against the happily 
remote contingency of war with a first-class power, and against that contingency the 
organization, training, and supply of our Army can be made very much more effective 
than they are. 

The administrative work of keeping up these numerous small posts, the excess of 
paper work required by the segregation of the units, and the large overhead charges 
constantly carried by such a system, have combined to make the maintenance of the 
Army extraordinarily expensive. It is difficult to make comparisons between it 
an^^JEoreign armies with accuracy, but it is a conservative estimate that we pay per 
effective rifleman between two and five times as much as any first-class power on the 
Continent of Europe; and this comparison is made after excluding from the comparison 
the higher pay and subsistence which our soldiers receive. 

My predecessors have frequently called attention to this unnecessary expense and 
to the impairment of efficiency caused by the foregoing facts, and have urged a reoi-- 
ganization of the Army upon a basis of larger tactical units and a rearrangement of 
garrisons with this in view. The necessity for such reorganization is now growing 
constantly more pressing. Not only is the population within the United States con- 
stantly increasing and thus outrunning its former ratio to the Army kept for its defense, 
but new demands are being constantly made for the withdrawal of portions of that 
Army to protect our outlying possessions. The fortifications recently authorized by 
Congress for the defense of Pearl Harbor and Honolulu in the Hawaiian Islands are 
approaching comijletion. This necessitates the establishment there of a sufficient 
mobile force to prevent successful landings on those coasts, of the island which are not 
protected by the fortifications of Pearl Harbor and Honolulu. The exits and locks 
of the Panama Canal must now be protected, and it has become necessary to send a 
mobile force of at least a brigade to the Isthmus of Panama as well as coast artillery- 
men, for this purpose. This not only gives protective insurance but turns the Navy 
free for its legitimate functions. The requirements of Alaska are growing. Each of 
these demands tends to deplete the mobile force left within the United States, and 
makes it even more essential than before that that force should be disposed of to the 
best instead of the least advantage. 

Finally, during the spring and summer we have had, in the mobilization of troops 
along the Mexican frontier, an object lesson in the great advantages in economy and 
efliciency which can be accomplished by a proper disposition of froops. 

A force of about 16,000 men was collected from various posts and concentrated 
into the tactical organization of a division and two separate brigades. Orders were 
issued to officers in command of these troops with a view to a careful study of the 
lessons of the mobilization, and interesting experiments were made for this purpose. 
During October, in company with the Chief of Staff, I visited the troops then remain- 
ing in the area of mobilization in the endeavor to obtain at first hand the benefit of 
the experiences thus acquired by our officers. 

STEPS TAKEN AND IN C^NTEJIPLATION. 

A thorough reorganization of our military establishment to remedy the foregoing 
defects would involve much legislation and would encounter many most serious 
difficulties. Upward of $94,000,000 have been spent upon our existing posts. Inef- 
fective and expensive to maintain as this system is, it nevertheless represents an 
investment which can not be easily changed nor abandoned. The source of profit 
which each post furnishes to neighboring communities causes a local pressure against 
any change in location and brings constant influence to bear toward further expendi- 
tures in that locality. Nevertheless, steps have been taken and other steps are in 
course of prosecution to correct so far as possible these faults of organization. 

The resolution (H. Res. 343) Which the committee has had under 
consideration is as follows: 

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, requested to send to the 
House of Representatives full information relative to certain statements made in his 
annual report for the year nineteen hundred and eleven concerning the distribution 
of the mobile Army of the United States in such manner as to involve needless expense, 
and concerning the location and construction of any Army posts in such manner as to 
involve unnecessary initial cost and unnecessary cost of maintenance, said informa- 
tion to cover specifically the following facts: 

First. The names of all Army posts which have- been located in their present situa- 
tions for reasons which are now totally obsolete. 

Second. The names of all Army posts which have been located in their present situa- 
tioas for reasons which were from the beginning purely local. 



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INFORMATION CONCERNING ARMY POSTS. 



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Third. The names of all Army posts which were originally placed where they are 
with reference to possible Indian troubles, and the names of such of these as may be 
placed where such troubles are now no longer possible. 
(V Fourth. The names of all Army posts which are situated in positions suited to meet 

. the strategic needs of^nationail action or defense. 

-|-r Fifth. The names of all posts which have been constructed and the names of all 

^P posts where any construction work has been carried on during the ten years ending 

oj June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eleven, upon a plan which involved maximum 

Qd initial cost of construction and maximum cost of maintenance in money and men; 

the amounts expended on such posts, respectively, for construction purposes during 

the said period; the names of all Army officers or officials of the War Department who 

have recommended such expenditures and approved such plans; and the names of 

all Army officers and officials of the War Department who have protested against such 

expenditures and plans. 

Sixth. The specific steps taken by the several Secretaries of War during the period 
of ten years ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eleven, to prevent unneces- 
sary expenditures and impairment of efficiency caused by ill-advis^ location and 
construction of posts and inefficient distribution of the mobile Army, and the reasons, 
so far as they can be assigned, why the successive heads of the War Department have 
been unsuccessful in preventing unnecessary expenditures and impairment of effi- 
ciency. 

Seventh. The present intention of the War Department with respect to recom- 
mending legislation with a view to putting an end to the present extravagant distri- 
bution of the Army, and the steps, if aiij^, already taken or now being taken by the 
department in preparing such recommendations. 

Eighth. A full statement of the serious difficulties anticipated by the department 
in carrying out the policies of economy and efficiency in respect to the subject 
matter of this inquiry. 

Ninth. The number and cost of Army posts which have been abandoned during 
the ten years ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eleven, and the names 
and cost of all Army posts which would have to be abandoned in order to put an end 
to the extravagance and inefficiency resulting from improper distribution of the 
mobile Army. 

Tenth. The estipaated annual saving in money which would follow an efficient 
and economical distribution of the mobile Army, assuming said Army to remain at 
its present size, and the estimated increase in number of officers and men which 
could efficiently be made in the mobile Army were it properly distributed within the 
present annual cost of maintaining the Army. 

The purpose of the resolution is to secure for the Congress and the 
pubhc fuU and specific information upon the very important ques- 
ttens which the Secretary of War has briefly treated in his report. 

Your committee in the course of its general inquiry into expendi- 
tures in the War Department at hearings held during the first session 
ofvthis Congress secured evidence tending to show that very large 
sums of public money have in the past been expended in the building 
of Army posts in an unwise manner. Such expenditures not only 
impose upon the Government a heaw and needless first-construction 
cost, but at the same time needlessly swell the annual cost of main- 
taining the Arm}^ without in any way increasing its efficiency, even 
resulting in many cases in actual lessening of the efficiency of the 
Army. 

The statement of the Secretary of War above quoted tends to 
confirm the information already secured by your committee, and it is 
believed that if these statements are fully justified by the facts it 
will be necessary in order to overcome the evil complained of to have 
the case stated with the greatest possible particularity and frankness, 
so that it may be made entirely clear where the public interest hes 
from the militar}^ point of view and to what extent the public interest 
is opposed by local interests. 

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